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676 PocKMAN v. LEONARD [39 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18349. In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.] 
LEONARD T. POCKMAN, Petitioner, v. J. PAUL LEON-
ARD, as President of San Francisco State College et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Public Employees-Levering Act-Construction.-Provisions 
of Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) which declare 
public employees to be civil defense workers, "subject to such 
civilian defense activities as may be assigned to them by their 
superiors or by law," do not impose on public employees a rule 
of martial law nor conscript public workers into military ser-
vice. 
[2] !d.-Levering Act-Civilian Defense-Activities of Teacher.-
Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) does not improperly 
subject teacher at state college to activities outside and beyond 
his regular duties, although it declares workers subject to 
such civil defense duties as may he assigned to them, since 
such tasks as the holding of fire drills and the instruction of 
pupils regarding their behavior during atomic explosions or 
air raids are within the scope of a teacher's duties and may be 
properly required of him regardless of the fact that they may 
also constitute civil defense activities. 
[3] !d.-Levering Act-Validity-Delegation of Legislative Power. 
-Provision of Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) that 
civil defense workers are subject to such activities "as may be 
assigned to them by their superiors or by law" does not in-
validly delegate legislative power to define and impose civil 
defense duties; the reasonable construction is that the su-
periors, in making assignments, are limited to such authority 
as they already have or may subsequently be granted by law. 
[4] Public Offi.cers-Oath-Form.-Const., art. XX, § 3, contain-
ing the form of oath to be administered to state officers and 
declaring that "no other oath, declaration, or test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office or public trust," does 
not prohibit the Legislature from prescribing an oath to such 
officers in a different form of words from that therein used, 
if the intent, object and meaning of the Constitution be not 
violated. 
[5] Id.-Oath-Form.-Const., art. XX, § 3, prohibits any oath or 
declaration which imposes a religious or political test. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, §52; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 7. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 8-17] Public Employees; [ 4, 5] Pub-
lic Officers, § 36; [6, 7] Public Officers, § 35. 
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[6a, 6b] !d.-Oath-Persons Included.-The prohibition in Const., 
art. XX, § 3, against any oath or test other than the one 
prescribed therein will be read as applying to every state 
and local officer and employee, such construction being in 
accord with the basic purpose of safeguarding the public 
and its servants by forbidding oaths and declarations re-
garding matters that bear no reasonable relationship to 
governmental service. 
[7] !d.-Oath-Persons Included.-Const., art. XX, § 3, requiring 
the oath therein prescribed to be taken by all officers except 
"inferior officers" exempted by the Legislature, shows that the 
requirement is not limited to the officers mentioned in Const., 
art. V, and that it at least includes all inferior officers who are 
not exempted. 
[8] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-Oath provisions of Gov. 
Code, § 3103, relating to membership in organizations advocat-
ing overthrow of the government by force or unlawful means, 
can reasonably be construed as referring only to affiliation 
with organizations known by the public employee to belong to 
the proscribed class, and each clause of the oath must be 
interpreted as requiring knowledge of the character of any 
group as to which a declaration is required. 
[9] Id.-Oath-Form.-Portion of oath prescribed by Gov. Code, 
§ 3103, requiring affiant to list any organizations, to which 
he has belonged in the five years preceding taking of the oath, 
that advocated overthrow of the government by force or 
violence or other unlawful means, calls for a statement of past 
loyalty which is relevant to present and future loyalty, and 
is not inconsistent with the spirit or intent of the oath pre-
scribed by Const., art. XX, § 3. 
[10] Id.-Oath-Form.-Oath required of public employees by 
Gov. Code, § 3103, is not a test of religious opinion, nor does 
it compel disavowal of any political belief or membership in 
any named party. 
[11] Id.-Oath.-Form.-While the oath prescribed by Gov. Code, 
§ 3103, requires the affiant to swear that he does not advocate 
or belong to any party or organization which advocates over-
throw of the government by force or violence or other un-
lawful means, these may not properly be called matters of 
political opinion, since the word "political" imports orderly 
conduct of government, not revolution. 
[12] Id.-Oath-Form.-Oath required of public employees by the 
Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) does not go beyond 
the object or meaning of Const., art. XX, § 3, and is not the 
type of "other oath, declaration or test" which was intended 
to be prohibited by that section. 
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[13] Id.-Regulations-Validity.-A person's associates, as well 
as his conduct, are relevant factors in determining fitness and 
loyalty, and the state, under its police power, may properly 
limit a person's freedom of choice between membership in 
organizations advocating overthrow of the government by 
force and employment in the school system. 
[14] Id.-Regulations-Validity.-Past conduct and loyalty have 
a reasonable relationship to present fitness and trustworthiness, 
and public servants may properly be required to furnish in-
formation regarding past membership in organizations that to 
their knowledge advocated the overthrow of government by 
force or other unlawful means. 
[15] Id.-Regulations-Validity.-The fact that divulging past or 
present membership in an organization advocating the over-
throw of government by force or other unlawful means may, 
under some circumstances, amount to self-incrimination does 
not render invalid a statute requiring such disclosure as a 
condition of public employment, since disclosure of the re-
quired information is a reasonable condition or qualification 
of employment. 
[16] Id.-Regulations-Validity.-Assuming that a permanent em-
ployee of a state college, with teacher's tenure, has a contract 
right to his position, an implied condition of the agreement 
is that he will be loyal to the government and that he will not 
advocate its overthrow by force, and the state under its police 
power may, as a means of implementing the implied condition, 
require such employee to make a declaration of loyalty and 
furnish relevant information. 
[17] Id. -Levering Act- When Applicable.-Since public em-
ployees were given a 30-day period of grace after the effective 
date of the Levering Act {Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) within 
which to decide whether or not they would take the oath pre-
scribed therein, the officers of a state college may not properly 
withhold payment for services rendered by a permanent em-
ployee thereof prior to the date on which he was required by 
law to take the oath, but, having failed to take the oath, he is 
not entitled to compensation for any subsequent period. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel officers of state 
college to certify name of associate professor on public pay-
roll and pay him salary withheld because of failure to execute 
oath required by Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109. Writ granted in 
part. 
Wayne M. Collins for Petitioner. 
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Edmund G. Brown, .Attorney General, H. H. Linney, Chief 
.Assistant .Attorney General, and Herbert E. Wenig, Deputy 
.Attorney General, for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This is an original proceeding in man-
damus brought by an associate professor at San Francisco 
State College to compel respondents to certify his name on the 
public payroll and to pay him salary which was withheld be-
cause of his failure to execute the oath required by sections 
3100-3109 of the Government Code, known commonly as the 
Levering .Act. (Stats. 1951 [3d Ex. Sess. 1950, ch. 7], p. 15.) 
The statute declares that all public employees are ''civil de-
fense workers, subject to such civilian defense activities as 
may be assigned to them by their superiors or by law," and 
it defines public employees as all persons employed by the state 
or any county, city, city and county, state agency or pub-
lic district, excluding aliens legally employed. (Gov. Code, 
§ § 3100-3101.) "Subject to the provisions of Section 3 of 
.Article XX of the Constitution," all civil defense workers 
are required to take the oath prescribed by section 3103 of 
the Government Code within the first 30 days of employment. 
(Gov. Code, § 3102.) It is further provided that no compen-
sation shall be paid to any civil defense worker by any public 
agency unless he has subscribed to the oath, and that it shall 
be the duty of the person certifying to public payrolls to ascer-
tain and certify that the oath has been taken by such workers. 
(Gov. Code, § 3107 .) Section 3108 declares that it is perjury 
to make false statements in the oath, and section 3109 makes 
it a felony for a person, after taking the oath and while in 
public employment, to advocate or become a member of an 
organization which advocates overthrow of the government by 
force or other unlawful means. The remaining sections (Gov. 
Code, §§ 3104-3106) specify the manner of taking and filing 
the oath and provide that compliance with the act shall be 
deemed compliance with Government Code sections 18150-
18158* relating to the taking of oaths by state employees. 
The act went into effect October 3, 1950. Petitioner failed 
to take the required oath within 30 days thereafter, and re-
spondents refused to certify his name to the public payroll 
*Gov. Code, §§ 18].50-18158, provide that every person appointed to a 
state position, whether civil service or noncivil service, shall within 30 
days of appointment take a prescribed oath which is the same as that 
set forth in Const., art. XX, § 3. 
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or to pay his salary for services rendered during the months 
of October and November. 
[1] The first question is whether the provisions which de-
clare public employees to be civil defense workers, "subject 
to such civilian defense activities as may be assigned to them 
by their superiors or by law," render the entire act invalid. 
(Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3101.) Petitioner asserts that the statute 
imposes on public employees a rule of martial law and "herds 
them into a headless, tailless and nondescript military body." 
There is nothing in the act, however, which purports to con-
script public workers into military service or which declares 
them to be subject to martial law. [2] Petitioner also claims 
that the act improperly subjects him to assignment to activi-
ties outside and beyond his regular duties. It is clear, how-
ever, that a teacher may properly be assigned certain duties 
relating to civil defense, such as the instruction of pupils re-
garding their behavior during atomic explosions, air raids or 
other attacks. Tasks of this type, like the holding of fire 
drills, are within the scope of the duties of a teacher and may 
be properly required of him regardless of the fact that they 
may also constitute civil defense activities. There is no com-
plaint that any specific civil defense duties have been imposed 
on petitioner under the act, and we should not assume that 
any improper assignments will be made. [3] The provi-
sion that workers are subject to such activities ''as may be 
assigned to them by their superiors or by law'' does not, as 
asserted, invalidly delegate legislative power to define and 
impose civil defense duties. Instead, the reasonable con-
struction is that the superiors, in making assignments, are 
limited to such authority as they already have or may sub-
sequently be granted by law. 
We turn now to other arguments made by petitioner. The 
oath which he has refused to take reads as follows: 
"I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of the State of California against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith 
and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose 
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties upon which I am about to enter. 
''And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, 
nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or 
Oct. 1952] PocKM.A.N v. LEONARD 
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otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Govern-
ment of the United States or of the State of California by 
force or violence or other unlawful means; that within the 
five years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or 
affirmation) I have not been a member of any party or organi-
zation, political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow 
of the Government of the United States or of the State of 
California by force or violence or other unlawful means 
except as follows : 
(If no affiliations, write in the words 'No Exceptions') 
and that during such time as I am a member or employee 
of the I will not 
(name of public agency) 
advocate nor become a member of any party or organization, 
political or otherwise, that advocates the overthrow of the 
Government of the United States or of the State of Califor-
nia by force or violence or other unlawful means.'' (Gov. 
Code, § 3103.) 
Section 3 of article XX of the state Constitution provides : 
''Members of the Legislature, and all officers, executive and 
judicial, except such inferior officers as may be by law ex-
empted, shall, before they enter upon the duties of their re-
spective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or 
affirmation. 
''I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be,) that 
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of California, and that I will faith-
fully discharge the duties of the office of -------
according to the best of my ability. 
''And no other oath, declaration, or test shall be required 
as a qualification for any office or public trust.'' 
When petitioner was appointed to the state college faculty 
in 1946 he took an oath identical to that prescribed in section 
3 of article XX, and he argues that he is exempted by the 
last sentence of that section from taking any ''other oath, 
declaration or test" and, hence, cannot be required to take 
the oath prescribed by section 3103 of the Government Code. 
When resort is had to the historical background of the con-
stitutional provision, it appears that the words "oath, declara-
tion or test" have an important connotation in connection 
with qualifications for public service. The English "test" 
act of 1673, which was so odious to the people, required all 
civil and military officers to take "oaths" of allegiance and 
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supremacy and to make ''declarations'' regarding matters 
of opinion, particularly religious beliefs. (Stat. 25 Car. II, 
c. 2; see 4 Blackstone Commentaries 59.) This act was un-
doubtedly in the minds of the framers of state Constitutions 
when they used these words in drafting constitutional pro-
visions similar to ours. (People v. Hoffman (1886), 116 Ill. 
587 [5 N.E. 596, 605, 8 N.E. 788, 56 Am.St.Rep. 793] ; 
Attorney General v. City of Detroit ( 1885), 58 Mich. 213 [ 24 
N.W. 887, 889-890, 55 Am.Rep. 675] ; Rogers v. City of Bttf-
falo ( 1888), 3 N.Y.S. 671, 673-67 4, affirmed, 123 N.Y. 173 
[25 N.E. 274, 278-279, 9 L.R.A. 579]] .) 
[4] The prohibition contained in section 3'-• was consid-
ered in the early case of Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, where 
it was said at page 310, ''In our judgment it was not intended 
to limit the action of the Legislature to the particular set 
form of words used in the Constitution, and it is clearly with-
in their power to prescribe any form, so that they do not go 
beyond the intent, object and meaning of the Constitution." 
And in Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196, 201 [65 P. 395], it was 
stated that the language in section 3 "leaves as the only 
matter for determination the single question, whether [the 
statute there involved] does impose an oath or test substan-
tially different from that prescribed by the Constitution.'' 
[5] In this connection, it would seem clear that any oath 
or declaration which imposes a religious or political test is 
prohibited. (See Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196, 201 [65 P. 
395] ; Rogers v. City of Buffalo, supra, 3 N.Y.S. at pp. 673-674; 
Attorney General v. C·ity of Detroit, supra, 24 N.W. at p. 
890 [concurring opinion] ; cf. United Public Workers v. 
JJ1·itcheU, 330 U.S. 75, 100 [67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754].) 
It has been recognized, however, that such a constitutional 
prohibition does not prevent the examination of public em-
ployees, for skill, education, or other qualities reasonably re-
lated to qualifications for public service. As said in Rogers 
v. City of Buffalo, 123 N.Y. 173 [25 N.E. 274_, 278, 9 L.R.A. 
579], in answer to a contention that "nothing but the bare 
oath" mentioned in the Constitution could be required, "We 
do not think that the provision above cited was ever intended 
to have any such broad construction. Looking at it as a 
matter of common sense, we are quite sure that the framers 
of our organic law never intended to oppose a constitutional 
barrier to the right of the people through their legislature 
*At the time of the Cohen case the provision appeared in 9 3, 
art XI, Const. of 1849. 
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to enact laws which should have for their sole object the pos-
session of fit and proper qualifications for the performance 
of the duties of a public office on the part of him who desired 
to be appointed to such office." (See, also, A.ttorney General 
v. City of Detroit, 58 Mich. 213 [24 N.W. 887, 889-890, 55 Am. 
Rep. 675] .) 
Before proceeding to determine whether the oath set forth 
in section 3103 of the Government Code is substantially the 
same as the constitutional oath, we shall consider respondents' 
contention that petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of 
the constitutional prohibition because, it is asserted, he is not 
the holder of an ''office or public trust'' within the meaning 
of that provision. [6a] The terms "office" and "public 
trust" have been said to be nearly synonymous (Ex parte 
Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 243 [ 85 Am.Dec. 62] ) , but the particular 
positions to which they apply have not been clearly defined. 
Different results have been reached in classifying public posi-
tions involving similar duties and responsibilities, and the 
meaning and extent of the term "office" tends to vary with 
the purpose of the statute in which it appears. (See, for ex-
ample, Patton v. Board of Health, 127 Cal. 388, 393-397 [59 
P. 702, 78 Am.St.Rep. 66] ; People v. Wheeler, 136 Cal. 652, 
654-655 [69 P. 435] ; Wall v. Board of Directors, 145 Cal. 
468, 471-472, 473 [78 P. 951] ; Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 
185-187 [201 P. 120] ; Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 525-
532 [228 P. 1040] ; Brooks v. City of Gilroy, 219 Cal. 766, 
770-772 [29 P.2d 212] ; People v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636, 639-
640 [107 P.2d 388]; Sims, "What is a P1tblic Office in Cali-
fornia," 8 So.Cal.L.Rev., 11 [1934] .) Accordingly, the cases 
which have dealt with the term in construing statutes unre-
lated to the subject involved here are not particularly help-
ful, and we must look to the purposes of section 3 in order 
to ascertain the intention of its framers. 
[7] There is no merit in respondents' suggestion that the 
only persons entitled to the benefit of the prohibition are mem-
bers of the Legislature, judges and the seven executive officers 
mentioned in article V of the Constitution.* The provision 
of section 3 requiring the oath to be taken by all officers, 
except ''inferior officers'' exempted by the Legislature, shows 
that the requirement is not limited to the persons named in 
*Those officers are: governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, 
controller, treasurer, attorney general and surveyor general. Pursuant to 
Const., art. V, § 19, the office of surveyor general was abolished by Pol. 
Code § 690, in 1929. 
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article v and that it at least includes all inferior officers who 
are not exempted. It would do violence to the plain mean-
ing of the words used ·if the section were read as providing 
that the Legislature might exempt "inferior officers" from 
taking the prescribed oath and at the same time compel them 
to take some other kind of ''oath, declaration or test.'' 
[6b] We are unable to find any place where a line can rea-
sonably be drawn so as to place some positions within and 
others outside the constitutional prohibition, and, in our 
opinion, there is no justification for excluding any public 
servants from its protection. The prohibition should there-
fore be read as applying to every state and local officer and em-
ployee. This construction is in accord with the basic pur-
pose of safeguarding the public and its servants by forbidding 
oaths and declarations regarding matters that bear no rea-
sonable relationship to governmental service and particu-
larly those that involve political and religious beliefs. Per-
sons in the lower levels of government are just as much en-
titled to this protection as those in higher positions. Any 
other interpretation of the prohibition would lead to the 
absurd result that the relatively few persons who occupy 
the most important positions could be required to take only 
the constitutional oath, while those who work under them and 
execute their orders could be compelled to submit to various 
other oaths, declarations and tests. 
\V e come now to the question whether there is any sub-
stantial difference between the oaths prescribed by the 
state Constitution and by section 3103 of the Government 
Code. The constitutional oath consists of a declaration or 
pledge of loyalty to the state and federal Constitutions, and 
a promise or pledge of faithful performance of duty. The 
first paragraph of the oath required by section 3103 contains 
substantially the same pledge of loyalty and faithful per-
formance of duty as that found in the constitutional oath, 
with only immaterial differences in language. In the second 
paragraph the affiant swears to three matters, namely, (1) 
that he does not advocate or belong to any organization that 
advocates overthrow of the government by force or violence 
or other unlawful means; (2) that within the five years im-
mediately preceding the taking of the oath he has not been 
a member of any such organizations except those which he 
lists in the space provided on the face of the oath; and (3) 
that while employed by the designated agency he will not 
Oct.1952] POCKM.AN v. LEONARD 
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advocate or become a member of any organization that advo-
cates such doctrines. 
[8] It should be noted at the outset that the oath provi-
sions relating to membership can reasonably be construed as 
referring only to affiliation with organizations known by the 
employee to belong to the proscribed class, and each clause 
of the oath must be interpreted as requiring knowledge of 
the character of any group as to which a declaration is re-
quired. (See Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 723-
724 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317].) 
The first and third parts of the second paragraph are 
essentially a declaration of present and future loyalty to 
the government of this state and of the United States. A 
person obviously cannot be loyal to a government and at 
the same time advocate its violent and unlawful overthrow. 
By the same token, voluntary unexplained membership in an 
organization known by a public employee to advocate such 
doctrines indicates that he has interests which are incon-
sistent with his pledge of loyalty and faithful performance 
of duty, and the Legislature, by requiring this oath, has 
in effect found that such membership is incompatible with 
loyalty.* In the recent case of Adler v. Board of Education 
of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 [72 S.Ct. 380, 386, 96 
L.Ed. 517], the United States Supreme Court sustained as 
reasonable an implied legislative finding that "the member 
by his membership supports the thing the organization stands 
for, namely the overthrow of the government by unlawful 
means.'' 
[9] The middle part of the second paragraph of the oath 
calls for disclosure of information relating to past loyalty. 
In it the affiant is required to list any organizations, to which 
he has belonged in the five years preced1ng taking of the 
oath, that advocated overthrow of the government by force 
or violence or other unlawful means. Information as to past 
affiliations may be relevant in determining whether an em-
ployee can be placed in a position of present or future public 
responsibility. (See Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 
716, 720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317]; Adler v. Board of 
*Since 1947 Gov. Code, § 1028 has provided: "It shall be sufficient 
cause for the dismissal of any public employees including teachers 
in the public schools or any state supported educational institution 
when such public employee or teacher advocates or is a member of 
an organization which advocates overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or of the State, by force, violence, or other un-
lawful means." 
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Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 [72 S.Ct. 
380, 385, 96 L.Ed. 517].) Nothirrg in section 3 of article 
XX is intended to prevent the state from requiring dis-
closure of facts relating to an employee's fitness and suit-
ability for public service, and inasmuch as this portion of 
the oath, in effect, calls for a statement of past loyalty which 
is relevant to present and future loyalty, it is in no way in-
consistent with the spirit or intent of the constitutional oath. 
[10] The oath required by section 3103 is obviously not a 
test of religious opinion. Neither does it compel disavowal 
of any political belief or membership in any named political 
party. [11] While it requires the affiant to swear that he 
does not advocate, or belong to any party or organization 
which advocates overthrow of the government by force or 
violence or other unlawful means, these may not properly be 
called matters of political opinion. The word ''political'' 
imports orderly conduct of government, not revolution, and 
the term is not applicable to advocacy of a belief in overthrow 
of the government by force or violence. (See Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.2d 481,485 [171 P.2d 21, 
166 A.L.R. 701] .) . 
[12] We are satisfied that there is nothing in the Levering 
oath which goes beyond the object or meaning of section 3 of 
article XX and that it is not the type of ''other oath, declara-
tion or test'' which was intended to be prohibited by that 
section. 
Nearly all of the contentions made by petitioner concern-
ing asserted violations of federal constitutional guarantees 
are answered adversely to him by recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. It has been held that a govern-
mental body has the right to direct that its employees shall 
not belong to organizations which they know advocate over-
throw of the government by force or other unlawful means, 
and that they may be required to make sworn statements simi-
lar to the oath prescribed by section 3103 as a condition to 
obtaining or continuing in public employment. (Adler v. 
Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 
[72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517] ; Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 
341 U.S. 716 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317] ; Gerende v. Board 
of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [71 S.Ct. 565, 95 L.Ed. 
745]; cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 
95 L.Ed. 1137] ; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed 925].) [13] A person's 
associates, as well as his conduct, are relevant factors in deter-
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mining fitness and loyalty, and the state, under its police 
power, may properly limit a person's freedom of choice be-
tween membership in such organizations and employment in 
the school system. (Adle1· v. Board of Education of the City 
of New York, 242 U.S. 485 [72 S.Ot. 380, 385,96 L.Ed. 517].) 
[14] Past conduct and loyalty have a reasonable relation-
ship to present fitness and trustworthiness, and public serv-
ants may properly be required to furnish information regard-
ing past membership in organizations that to their knowl-
edge advocated the overthrow of government by force or 
other unlawful means. (See Garner v. Board of Pttblic Works, 
341 U.S. 716, 719-720 [71 S.Ot. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317].) 
[15] The fact that divulging past or present membership 
may, under some circumstances, amount to self-incrimination 
does not render the act invalid since the disclosure of the re-
quired information is a reasonable condition or qualification 
of employment. (See Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. 
App.2d 564 [92 P.2d 416]; 64 Harv.L.Rev., 987-996; 28 Cal. 
L. Rev., 94-95; cf. United Pttblic Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 
75 [67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754] .) 
[16] Petitioner is a permanent employee of the college 
with teacher's tenure, and he claims that the act has been 
applied so as to impair contractual obligations. Even if we 
assume that petitioner has a contract right to his position, 
there can be no question that an implied condition of the 
agreement is that he will be loyal to the government and that 
he will not advocate its overthrow by force. Under its po-
lice power the state may, as a means of implementing the 
implied condition, require its employees to make a declara-
tion of loyalty and furnish relevant information. ''The 
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presup-
poses the maintenance of a government by virtue of which 
contractual relations are worth while, -a government which 
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order 
of society." (Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 435 [54 S.Ot. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481] ; cf. East 
New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 [66 S.Ct. 
69, 90 L.Ed. 34, 160 A.L.R. 1279]; Lincoln Union v. North-
western Co., 335 U.S. 525, 531-532 [69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 
212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473] ; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & L. Assn., 
310 U.S. 32, 38 [60 S.Ot. 792, 84 L.Ed. 1061] .) . [17] It ap-
pears, however, that respondents applied the act improperly 
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in withholding payment for services rendered by petitioner 
prior to the date on which he was required by law to take 
the oath. (Stats. 1951 [3d ex. sess. 1950, ch. 7, § 2] pp. 15, 
17.) Employees were given a 30-day period of grace aft,er 
the effective date of the act within which to decide whether 
or not they would take the oath, and it would be unreasonable 
to hold that the Legislature intended to require a forfeiture 
of the salary earned during this period in the event that an 
employee chose to leave his position rather than comply with 
the condition. 
It follows that petitioner is entitled to compensation for 
services rendered up to and including 30 days following 
October 3, 1950, the effective date of the statute, but, having 
failed to take the oath, he is not entitled to compensation for 
any subsequent period. 
Insofar as petitioner seeks payment of salary or other relief 
for any period subsequent to 30 days after October 3, 1950, 
the application is denied. Let a writ of mandate issue for 
the limited purpose of directing payment of petitioner's salary 
up to and including 30 days after October 3, 1950. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The only word of commendation which I can speak for 
the opinions of the court in these cases is that they bring 
into sharp focus the loyalty oath hysteria which has pervaded 
this country and particularly this state during the past five 
or six years. The concept that a person exposed to subversive 
activity may be immunized against such exposure by the 
taking of a so-called loyalty oath opens the door for vast 
exploration in the field of metaphysical research. While this 
process is taking place the loyalty of every public employee 
is impugned even though he has taken the oath prescribed by 
the Constitution many times and has obeyed it religiously. It 
must be conceded, however, that those who have been loyal 
may become disloyal and that ''eternal vigilance is the price 
of liberty," but it should not follow that vigilance against 
disloyalty of public employees requires that they take an oath 
proscribed by the Constitution. The holding of the majority 
in these cases requires the taking of such an oath. 
From the records before us in the various cases decided 
by the opinions this day filed, it would appear that many days, 
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weeks and possibly months were consumed by the state Legis-
lature, the Board of Regents of the University of California 
and the various boards of supervisors and city councils of 
the counties and cities of California in the preparation, 
discussion and adoption of various loyalty oath proposals. In 
addition to the time consumed in the legislative field, these 
cases have been before the various courts of this state during 
the past two or three years where thousands of pages of 
transcripts and briefs have been prepared and filed and the 
time and effort of numerous judges and lawyers has been 
consumed in their disposition. In my opinion all of this time 
and effort, as well as the money necessarily expended in con-
nection with the legislation and judicial proceedings, which 
must have amounted to thousands, if not millions of dollars, 
was, and is entirely wasted, and has been and will be of no 
benefit whatsoever either to the general public or the in-
dividuals affected thereby. There can be no eseape from this 
con elusion when we consider that the Constitution of this state 
expressly and specifically declares the form of oath required 
of all persons holding any public position under the law of this 
state, and expressly provides that: "No other oath, declara-
tion or test shall be required as a qualifieation for any office 
or public trust." (Cal. Const., Art. XX, § 3.) The oath 
prescribed by the Constitution is a simple, concise declaration, 
solemnly made by the person taking it, that he will support the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the 
State of California and faithfully discharge the duties of the 
office or employment which he is undertaking to the best of his 
ability. The constitutional provision, by implication at least 
confers upon the l1egislatnre the power to require that this 
oath be taken by all who occupy any office or public trust 
under the law of this state and the Legislature saw fit to 
require that all state employees take such oath. (See Gov. 
Code, § 18150 et seq.) It is a conceded fact in each of these 
cases that every employee of the state here involved took the 
constitutional oath long before the enactment of the acts which 
constitute the basis of this litigation. Notwithstanding this 
undisputed fact, the majority of this court holds in each of 
these cases that these petitioners are required to take another 
oath prescribed by the so-ealled Levering Act (Stats., 1951 
[3d ex. sess. 1950, ch. 7, p. 15]) which, it is said, is no 
different than the oath prescribed by the Constitution. The 
majority nevertheless holds that because each of the peti-
tioners has failed to take the oath prescribed by the Levering 
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Act, they have forfeited their position with the state in ac-
cordance with the provisions of that act. This is indeed 
strange and paradoxical reasoning. In effect the majority 
says: No employee of the state is required to take any other 
oath than that prescribed by the Constitution, but even though 
all employees of the state have taken the constitutional oath, 
they must also take the I1evering Act oath which is the same 
as that prescribed by the Constitution, and if they do not 
take the Levering Act oath, they are ineligible for employment 
by the state. If there is any logic or common sense in such 
reasoning, it is not apparent to me and I have grave doubt that 
it will appeal to any thinking person. 
I have no doubt as to the good intentions of the various 
legislative bodies which adopted these loyalty oath proposals, 
and I do not consider it the function of the judicial branch 
of the government to pass upon the wisdom of such proposals. 
The sole and only question before the courts is whether the 
enactments contravene some provision of the fundamental 
law-the Constitution. This is true even though a very grave 
question of public policy may be involved. It is for the 
Legislature and not the courts to declare the public policy 
of the state, providing such declaration is not in conflict with 
the Constitution. 
We are therefore met at the outset of this discussion with 
the problem of what was intended by the framers of the Con-
stitution when they wrote into article XX, section 3, the 
words: ''And no other oath, declaration, or test shall be re-
quired as a qualification for any office or public trust.'' 
The section as it now appears in the Constitution of 1879 is 
precisely the same, word for word, as it was in the Constitu-
tion of 1849. There it was article XI, section 3. (Browne, 
The Debates in the Convention of California on the Forma-
tion of the State Constitution, Wash. 1850, App. X.) Though 
there was debate on changing the language in the 1878 Con-
vention, no change was made. 
It seems clear that what the delegates to the original con-
vention in Monterey in 1849 had in mind is the mandate of 
article VI, clause 3, of the federal Constitution and the ex-
perience leading up to the adoption of that clause. The debate 
in the 1849 Convention was singularly short. The committee 
which brought in the clause proposed the following (Browne, 
Debates, p. 255) :"Members of the Legislature, and all officers, 
before they enter upon the duties of their offices, shall take 
the following oath or affirmation: I (A B) do solemnly swear 
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(or affirm), that I will faithfully and impartially discharge 
and perform all the duties incumbent on me as ---, accord-
ing to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably 
to the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and of 
this State; and I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
since the adoption of the present Constitution, I, being a 
citizen of this State, have not fought a duel with deadly 
weapons within this State, nor out of it, with a citizen of this 
State, nor have I sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel 
with deadly weapons, with a citizen of this State, nor have I 
acted as second in carrying a challenge, or aided, or advised, 
or assisted any person thus offending. So help me God." 
Thus it will be seen that the committee proposed that all 
members of the Legislature and ''all officers'' take an oath 
in two parts, one as to the Constitution of the State and of the 
United States and the other as to not having participated in a 
duel. (The convention had just adopted article XI, section 2, 
providing that anyone who after the adoption of the Con-
stitution participated in a duel shall be deprived of, inter 
alia, holding any office of profit under the Constitution. 
Browne, Debates, p. 255.) 
Mr. Halleck thereupon proposed a substitute in the lan-
guage of the present article XX, section 3, because "this sub-
stitute was the most simple he would find on the subject in any 
of the Constitutions." (Emphasis added.) (Browne, De-
bates, p. 256.) Mr. McDougal opposed the substitute on the 
ground that the section as proposed by the committee was 
necessary to carry out the object of the preceding section. A 
vote was taken on the substitute: it was adopted, and became 
a part of the proposed Constitution. 
A comparison of the language of article XI, section 3, now 
article XX, section 3, shows a striking similarity to the lan-
guage of article VI, clause 3, of the federal Constitution. A 
look at the federal constitutional debates should therefore 
prove helpful. 
The idea that the legislative, executive and judicial officers, 
within the several states, ought to be bound by oath to sup-
port the Articles of the Union was proposed by Mr. Randolph 
( 5 Elliott, Debates on the Federal Constitution 128), Messrs. 
Sherman, Gerry and Luther Martin felt the requirement in-
truded improperly on the states, but Mr. Randolph's idea 
prevailed (5 Elliott 183, 351, 352). During the debate Mr. 
Wilson said ''he was never fond of oaths, considering them 
as left handed security only. A good government did not need 
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them, and a bad one could not or ought not to be supported.'' 
( 5 Elliott 352.) 
The idea that ''no religious test or qualification shall ever 
be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the 
United States" was first proposed to the convention by Mr. 
Pinckney (5 Elliott, 446, 498), Mr. Sherman thought it un-
necessary, "the prevailing liberality, being a sufficient security 
against such tests.'' ( 5 Elliott, 498.) But the convention was 
cautious and adopted Mr. Pinckney's views ( 5 Elliott, 598), 
just as the whole country was cautious in insisting on the 
first ten amendments, now known as ''The Bill of Rights.'' 
The two ideas were combined and emerged as Article VI, 
clause 3 (5 Elliott, 564). Thus, it appears, if anything, that 
the California delegates, though taking a leaf from the federal 
Constitution, went further and proscribed not only religious 
test oaths, as had the federal delegates, but any test oath. 
Nor did the debates in the 1878 convention change the pic-
ture. Four amendments to the 1849 language were suggested. 
All of them were defeated. (III Debates and Proceedings of 
the Constitutional Convention of the State of California 
[1878], pp. 1390-1391.) 'rhe first dealt with a requirement 
of bonds for sheriffs and marshals. The second deleted the 
word "executive," replaced it with "ministerial" and added 
oath requirements as to dueling·, bribery, and employment of 
Asiatics. The third was an amendment to the second and 
deleted the words ''members of the legislature,'' ''judicial'' 
and "ministerial," and added the words "state, county, town-
ship, district and municipal, executive, legislation, judicial 
and ministerial." The fourth struck out the word "test." 
Each of these suggestions was defeated, one by one. If 
anything can be gleaned from this legislative history, it is 
that the delegates of 1878 determined to leave the provision 
as it had always been-in simple language meaning what it 
said: That only one oath could be required for those in the 
public employ and one only. The abhorrence for test oaths for 
the servants of the public which prevailed in Monterey in 
1848 and in Philadelphia in 1787 prev~iled in Sacramento in 
1878. It would prevail today were it not for the hysteria and 
name calling which has tended to obscure the traditional con-
cept of the framers of both Constitutions. 
It should be noted that the Levering Act oath is strikingly 
similar in its language and tone to the third and fourth 
amendments suggested at the Constitutional Convention of 
1878. Indeed the first paragraph of the Levering Act is almost 
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identical, word for word, with the first paragraph of the 
defeated 1878 amendments. And the second paragraph re-
sounds as though in echo to the sentiments which moved the 
gentlemen in 1878 to propose an oath that one had not em-
ployed Asiatics. 
But historical coincidence aside, the Levering Act oath and 
the constitutional oath are as different as day from night both 
in content and intent. In the first place, the constitutional 
oath is not a perjury oath. It relates to a state of mind, a 
promise in good faith to perform one's duties to the best of 
one's abilities. That an oath of office as relates to the future 
performance of duties does not relate to perjury was recog-
nized by the Legislature even before the 1879 Constitution 
was enacted. (See Pen. Code, § 120.) Furthermore, it is clear 
that the constitutional oath is a promissory declaration in-
tended to solemnize an occasion and to impress upon the mind 
of the employee the trust upon which he is about to enter. It 
is not intended to inhibit one's thinking nor one's associa-
tions. 
The majority holds that "We are satisfied that there is 
nothing in the Levering oath which goes beyond the object or 
meaning of section 3 of Article XX and that it is not the' type 
of 'other oath, declaration or test' which was intended to be 
prohibited by that section.'' With this statement, I most 
emphatically disagree. The constitutional oath relates to the 
future : ''I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) 
that I will support the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of California, and that I will 
faithfully discharge the duties of . . . . " There can be no 
other meaning than that from the time of taking employment 
and the oath the affiant will support the constitutions. The 
Levering oath, on the other hand, calls for an oath regarding 
past activities: ''that within the five years immediately pre-
ceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been 
a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, 
that advocated ... " So far as the balance of the Levering 
Act is concerned, it might possibly be inferred from the 
constitutional oath that in swearing to support the two con-
stitutions, the affiant swears to defend them "against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic" and that he would not be-
come a member of any organization advocating the overthrow 
of the two governments by force and violence since the two 
matters just set forth would be, in reality, one and the same 
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thing. But the fact remains that the words so stating are 
not in the constitutional oath except by implication. No such 
implication may be read into the constitutional oath with re-
spect to that portion of the Levering Act relating to past 
affiliations. The above quoted statement from the majority 
opinion is deceptive in its simplicity in that it seeks to uphold 
the Levering Act, since that is the popular thing to do, but 
must in some manner avoid the clear, positive and unequivocal 
mandate of the Constitution that "no other oath, declaration 
or test shall be required as a qualification for any office or 
public trust.'' The only way to avoid that provision is to say 
that there is no substantial difference between the two oaths. 
And to say that there is no substantial difference between the 
two is the heighth of absurdity. As was said in Sheehy v. Shinn, 
103 Cal. 325 [37 P. 393], the Constitution will not be so con-
strued as to permit an evasion of it; and to give effect to that 
instrument it has been declared to be as much the duty of 
the court to see that it is not evaded as that it is not directly 
violated. Inasmuch as constitutional provisions are, and have 
always been, unless expressly provided to the contrary, to be 
constmed as prospective in operation, what can the result 
reached here be considered but an evasion of the provision 
declaring that no other oath, declaration or test shall be re-
quired f 
If, as stated by the majority, there is no substantial dif-
ference between the two oaths, it would appear that the Lever-
ing Act adds nothing to the constitutional oath and is, there-
fore, a nullity. All these petitioners have taken the constitu-
tional oath and, if the two are the same, there appears to be 
no sound reason why they should lose their positions and 
means of earning a livelihood because they have refused to 
do a useless act. The law does not require useless acts (or 
so we have always been told), but if we follow the reasoning 
of the majority to its illogical conclusion, the law does require, 
on pain of dismissal from employment, the doing of such an 
act. 
An act of government undertaken without constitutional 
authority and in excess of constitutional limitations is a nullity 
in law and may properly be disobeyed or resisted. "The con-
stitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable 
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative 
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the Legislature 
shall please to alter it. 
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''If the former part of the alternative be true, then a 
legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the 
latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd at-
tempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own 
nature illimitable. 
''Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount 
law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such 
government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant 
to the constitution, is void.'' (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 
137, 177.) 
It is admitted by the majority that the two early cases of 
Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 and Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 
196 [65 P. 395], held that the question involved in litigation 
of this sort was whether the Legislature had, in prescribing 
an oath, gone ''beyond the intent, object and meaning of the 
Constitution" and whether the Legislature had prescribed 
an oath or test substantially different from that prescribed 
by the Constitution. .As I have heretofore pointed out, the 
Levering .Act provision relating to past affiliations at least 
goes far beyond the intent, object and meaning of the Consti-
tution. It cannot then be said, with a clear conscience, that the 
two oaths are substantially similar inasmuch as the Consti-
tion in this respect speaks only of the present and the future. 
It cannot be denied that the two Constitutions are the supreme 
law of the state and of the United States and, as said by John 
Marshall, the greatest Chief .Justice this country has ever 
known: ''Those, then, who controvert the principle that the 
constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, 
are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must 
close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. 
''This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions. It would declare that an act which, 
according to the principles and theory of our government, is 
entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory .... 
[Such doctrine cannot be tolerated under the Constitution.] 
It is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contem-
plated. that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, 
as well as of the legislature. 
''Why otherwise does it [the Constitution J direct the judges 
to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in 
an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. 
How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used 
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as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violat-
ing what they swear to support!" (Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 178-180.) 
The above quoted language of Chief Justice Marshall ap-
plies with equal force to the evasion practiced by this court 
in subverting the clear mandate of this provision of the Con-
stitution to the additional requirements imposed by the 
Levering Act. 
The principle here involved is of tremendous importance 
to those who believe in preserving the constitutional guar-
antees of fundamental civil liberties. These constitutional 
guarantees were written in the light of bitter experiences 
arising out of the exercise of arbitrary power or usurpation 
of power by the legislative or executive branch of the govern-
ment. Constitutions were written to protect the individual 
against the exercise of such arbitrary power. The lessons of 
history reveal that at various times under the stress of in-
flamed public opinion both the Legislature and the Executive 
have attempted to circumvent constitutional restrictions by 
adopting measures which seemed expedient in view of the 
exigencies of the situation at hand. In my opinion the Lever-
ing Act is such a measure. I think it is apparent from the 
language of the act that its proponents believed that the 
Legislature had the power to prescribe a different oath for all 
employees of the state except the constitutional officers, and 
that it was under this mistaken belief that the act was adopted. 
Now that this court has held that the constitutional prohibi-
tion against any other oath, declaration or test applies to every 
state and local officer and employee, the Levering Act which 
was designed 'to apply to all employees of the state except 
constitutional officers, should fall. 
To my mind it is too plain to permit of argument that it 
was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that "no 
other oath, declaration or test'' should ever be required of 
any publ1c officer or employee of the state or any of its 
political subdivisions than that specifically provided for in 
article XX, section 3 of the Constitution. The action taken 
at the constitutional conventions clearly demonstrates the 
correctness of this position. The defeat of proposed amend-
ments which sought to enlarge the scope of the oath, the failure 
to confer upon the Legislature power to do anything other 
than exempt such inferior officers as it saw fit from taking 
the prescribed oath and the specific prohibition against re-
Oct.1952] PocKMAN v. LEONARD 
[39 C.2d 676; 249 P.2d 267] 
697 
quiring any "other oath, declaration or test . as a qualifi-
cation for any office or public trust,'' makes it crystal clear 
that the framers of the Constitution intended to prevent just 
what the Levering Act is designed to accomplish. In other 
words they sought to limit and define the power of the 
Legislature in what history had revealed to be a most con-
troversial field. Such being the obvious and unmistakable 
intention of the framers of the Constitution, the language of 
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, supra, is par-
ticularly pertinent: " ... [T]he powers of the legislature 
are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mis-
taken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what pur-
pose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limita-
tion committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time 
be passed by those intended to be restrained? It is a proposi-
tion too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls 
any legislative act rep~rgnant to it j or, that the legislature 
may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. Between 
these two alternatives there is no middle ground. The Con-
stitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative 
act, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall 
please to alter it. . . . If an act of the legislature, repugnant 
to the Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its in-
validity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? 
It is emphatically the privilege and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is . ... So, if a law be in opposi-
tion to the Constitution ; if both the law and the Constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide 
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitu-
tion, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules shall 
govern the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 
But the majority of this court by its decisions in these 
cases is forsaking its sworn duty to support the Constitution 
of the State of California, and has abdicated its power, for 
the sake of expediency, to uphold an act which invades the 
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties of those affected by 
its mandates. 
There is no question of loyalty involved in any of these 
cases. So far as appears from the records before us every 
employee here involved was fully investigated and there is 
no suggestion of any conduct even bordering on subversive 
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activity on the part of any of them. They have merely sought 
to stand on their constitutional right to take the one and only 
oath which the Constitution prescribed. On this stand I un-
qualifiedly join them. 
I would, therefore, grant the writ prayed for and restore 
petitioner to his position. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22035. In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.] 
JUNE HIRSCHMAN et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF 
LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-A county civil service em-
ployee may properly be directed by the board of supervisors 
to swear that he is not, and since December 7, 1941, has not 
been, a member of any organization which advocates the over-
throw of the government by force, except those which he may 
list, including those specifically named if they should ever 
be determined by a court of law to advocate such overthrow, 
since such direction, when properly construed, requires him 
to designate only those of the named organizations which he 
knows advocates overthrow of the government by force, or 
which to his knowledge has been held by a court to advocate 
such action. 
[2] !d.-Oath-Persons Included.-Gov. Code, § 1360 et seq., re-
quiring all officers to take the constitutional oath, did not 
apply to all persons in P1lblic employment, and the field of 
loyalty oath requirements for all persons in county service 
was not preempted by statute until the adoption of the Lever-
ing Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) which expressly requires 
all county employees to take the oath prescribed therein. 
(Opinion on denial of rehearing.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. W. Turney Fox, Judge. Affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 52; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 7. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Public Employees. 
